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This thesis examines the design of a local area network
that is able to simultaneously handle users at a variety of
security levels, while providing full multilevel protection
cf the data. A major feature of the design is the use of
trusted software in the network interfaces tc provide
security for data entering or leaving the network. This
secure design was initiated tc investigate options for local
area network technology that could be incorporated into the
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I« IN1BOD0CTION
The Department of Defense (DoD) is currently upgrading
the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)
in an effort to evolve the existing Automated Data
Processing (ADP) capabilities into a new WWMCCS Information
System (WIS).
Plans for this modernization call for a communications
medium that will allow terminals to communicate with both
single-level and multilevel secure functional resources that
would be required at a WIS site. The WWMCCS System Engineer
has proposed that the medium be a local area network (LAN)
[Ref. 1]. Since the WIS is to be based around a LAN, and
resources of different levels will require LAN access, the
LAN must be multilevel secure from the beginning. However,
a "controlled mode" LAN may be acceptable initially.
Sidhu and Gasser [Ref. 2] have designed a secure LAN
that is based upon the "trusted system" concept. This
thesis exams their design option for a secure LAN that can
be incorporated into an initial scenario to provide multi-
level security for WIS sites.

II. BACKGROUND
In Sidhu and Gassers' design it is assumed that the
communication medium is as well protected as the users' work
stations, safes; etc. Therefore, encryption of the data is
not a requirement except where the medium must pass through
an unprotected zone, such as between buildings. Their
design gcal is to enforce the DoD security policy [Ref. 3]
with respect to accessing data en the communications medium,
while enabling a wide variety of resources to be shared.
The constraints of a typical WWMCCS command center envi-
ronment motivated the design. At a typical WWMCCS node data
processing must be carried out at multiple security levels,
with users requiring access to multiple levels of data. The
cost of certifying and accrediting physical facilities for
high levels of security dictates that net all facilities may
be cleared to hold classified data. Therefore, an example
of their design goal is to make Secret data from one network
(which handles data up to the Secret level) available to a
Secret subscriber on another network which handles data up
to the Top Secret level (note that this design does not take
into account a control for need-tc-know) . Also, the design
must prevent Top Secret data from spilling (from a Top
Secret controlled mode network) into a Secret controlled
mode network.
The key to Sidhu and Gassers 1 trusted systems approach
is the use of trusted interface units (TIUs) that govern
secure communication between subscribers only at identical
security levels. Outgoing data are marked by the TIO with
the security level of its attached subscriber. All data
ccmir.g irtc a subscriber is examined by the TIU to ensure
that its security level matches that of the attached
subscriber.

Ancther aspect cf the design calls for bridges that.
allow data to be shared among physically separate LANs. For
example, the bridges would govern the sharing of data
between a Secret controlled mode network and a Top Secret
controlled mode network, as previously described. The
bridge is configured as a network subscriber whose task is
to relay data to ancther network, which also acts as a
retwcrk subscriber. While relaying data, the bridge ensures
that no data shall be placed on a network that is not
cleared to handle the security level of the data.
The WIS modernization program dictates that the secure
IAN be available arcund 1985. Another design goal is to
implement an initial secure LAN capability within this time
frame. lor this reason, Sidhu and Gasser stress a near-term
solution in great detail, with progressively less detail
provided for the more complex longer term solutions.
The remainder of this thesis discusses the architectural
components, concept, operational environment and design
details cf this particular approach to multilevel security




The IAN configuration contains the following: subnet-
works and their conmunica tions media, trusted interface
units, bridges, gateways and guards. An overview cf these
components follows.
A. SUBNETSCRKS
A subnetwork is a part of the LAN that fully resides
within a protected environment (an area physically protected
to a specified system-high security level that corresponds
to a portion of a tuilding, whole building or group of
buildings) . Protected environments are further defined by
the proximity of a set of subscribers which operate up to a
given security level. If parts of a subnetwork passes
through an unprotected area, then it is assumed that encryp-
tion devices will be used that can handle the bandwidth of
the subnetwork, or a separate subnetwork cculd be
constructed with an intervening bridge. It is assumed that
the protected environment will include any encrypted
porticns of the medium.
B. TBOSTED INTERFACE UNITS (TIUS)
To access a network a subscriber connects to a TIU that
places the proper security markings on all data entering the
IAN from the subscriber, and in return provides the
subscriber with only that data from the LAN that has the
proper security labels. It should be noted that subscribers
attached to a subnetwork may operate at any security level
at or below that of the subnetwork environment.
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Initially, a single-level subnetwork has been proposed
for the vast majority of users that will require only a
single-level environment and for the evolutionary growth of
the LAN [Ref. U: p. 10]. Although this particular single-
level (fcr example, Secret) TIU supports a single-level
Secret subscriber, the subnetwork interface within the TIU
is actually multilevel since it has access to all data on
the subnetwork. Therefore, the single-level TIUs are
considered trusted, while the single-level subscriber need
not be.
Variable-level TIUs support subscribers who may operate
at different security levels at different times. This
particular TIU is the same as single-level TIUs, except that
their security level acay change over time.
For multilevel subscribers, multilevel TIUs are
required. The difference between a multilevel TIU and a
variable-level or single-level TIU (in terms of the trusted
mechanism in the TIU) are discussed further in chapter VI.
C. BBIDGES
The subnetworks comprising the LAN are themselves local
area networks that are connected to each other with bridges
[Hef. 5: p- 1497-1517]. The bridges therefore provide the
links between subnetworks at the same or different security
levels. Bridges must be trusted to prevent packets on a
higher level subnetwork fro m -entering a lower security level
subnetwork, if those packets originated with a subscriber
operating above the lower level. This precaution is due to
the fact that one subnetwork may be protected to a lower





Cn€ of the ultimate goals of the Wis upgrade is to
provide WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) access to all LAN
subscribers at a site [Ref. 1], therefore necessitating a
gateway connected directly to the LAN. To be fully useful,
the gateway to any multilevel network (i.e., WIN, Defense
Data Network (DDN), cr other wide-area networks) must itself
te multilevel secure, including the gateway's interface to
the LAN. It should be noted that Sidhu and Gasser focus
only on the LAN protlem and do not address gateways to any
detailed extent.
E. GOABES
Also employed in this design are guard nodes that allow
information to move from one security level to another in a
controlled manner. Generally, a guard is a trusted computer
that examines output from a single-level computer running at
a "high" security level and transfers that data tc another
computer or subscriber running at a "low" level [Eef. 6].
The purpose of the guard is to allow data to flow from high
to lew if that data is actually classified at the lew level
tut happens to reside in the high level environment. A
guard may also be used to selectively downgrade output from
a high level system. In order to prevent accidental down-
grading, guards may examine data flowing from low to high
for "acceptable" values. An example of the use of a guard
is where there is a reed for a Secret user to access Secret
data residing in a Top Secret subnetwork. In this case,
guards are required because existing mainframes are not
trusted for multilevel or controlled mode operation.
Existing mainframes must run at the level of the most sensi-
tive data (single-level system-high), even though the
system-high information is only a small portion of the total
13

data. Therefore the guard provides an inexpensive alterna-
tive tc clearing all users to the system-high level who must
access such data.
A guard usually operates with one high side and one low
side, each at specific fixed levels. The guard car. then be
easily interfaced tc the secure LAN by the use of two
single-level TIUs, cne for each side. Figure 3. 1 illus-
trates cne particular guard system that could be used on a
secure LAN [Ref- 7: p. 5]. Data flowing from a high subnet-
work wculd enter the guard via the high TID and send the
downgraded results via the low TIO to the appropriate
subscriber. This wculd imply that the guard must reside on
a subnetwork with a level at least that of the high subnet-
work. The guard system in figure 3.1 is logically parti-
tioned into guard trusted and untrusted functions. The
guard trusted functions provide the capability to ensure the
secure interchange cf information across security bounda-
ries. The guard lew and high untrusted functions support
the guard trusted information flow functions, provide appli-
cation system specific functions that are not security rele-
vant, and act as an interface between the guard trusted
processing element and its external application system
environment
.
The guard system consists of three (3) computer
programs: Guard Trusted Processing (GTP) element. Guard Low
Processing (GLP) element, and the Guard High Processing
(GHP) element. The GTP element provides all guard trusted
functions. The GLP and GHP elements provide all guard low
and high untrusted funcions, respectively.
The GLP and GHP elements are functionally symmetric in
that each acts as an interface between the GTP and its
correspcrding external application system environment (low
or high) . The GLP and GHP each consist of three logical
elements: an application system interface that interprets
1U

application system protocol; a guard protocol interface
which provides a secure communications path between guard
untrusted and trusted elements in support of the guard
information flow functions; and guard untrusted
application-specific functions which are not security rele-
vant and, therefore need not be trusted. Since single-level
TIU interfaces are csed in figure 3. 1, the guard would be
treated by the LAN as two separate single-level subscribers.
It should be noted that another option would be tc use a
single multilevel TIG for the guard.
Sidhu and Gasser have assumed that existing and planned
guards, such as the cne just, described, will function on the
secure LAN with little or no modification, other than that
normally required to interface any host to a LAN.
15





























There are two major areas of DoD security policy which
must fce addressed when considering a local area network
security architecture. The first is "user separation".
This concept refers tc the ability of a network security
design tc provide segregated communities of subscribers such
that traffic from individual communities can be transmitted
tc authorized subscribers in those communities and not
disclosed tc subscribers outside those communities. That
is, seme network component must ensure -hat an Unclassified
subscriber receives enly Unclassified information over the
local network. The enforcement of this policy provides
protecticn against unauthorized disclosure to authorized tut
uncleared subscribers on the network.
The secend policy area is the concept of "data protec-
tion". This refers tc the ability of the network to prcvide
protecticn against malicious at-cempts to access, modify or
destroy information in the network. This includes
subverting authorized network components and attaching unau-
thorized network components. In order to enforce this
policy t*o approaches may by used— encryption (end-to-end)
or Protected Wireline Distribution System (PWDS) [Ref. 8].
A PWCS provides physical protection of network components
including the transmission medium, whereas encryption
provides protection by making the information
unintelligible.
Sidhu aid Gasser describe their overall solution concept
in two stages-- from the simplest LAN to the most complex
LAN. In their concept it can be seen that "user separation"
and "cata protection" are incorporated by means of subnet-
works and encryption of the LAN medium itself.
17

A. SIMFLE MULTILEVEL LAN
A simple multilevel LAN would appear as in figure 4.
1
[Eef. 2: p. 5], with a simple LAN communications medium
supporting a variety of resources or subscribers (i.e.,
hosts, terminals, and such devices as printers and mass
storage units) . Subscribers may operate at various security
levels, tut communication is restricted between subscribers
to these of the same level. If there are subscribers of
more than one security level, then only designated multi-
level hosts or terminals (trusted to protect information at
several classification levels) would be able to communicate
with their.
Each single-level resource will be protected and
controlled to process information up to a designated maximum
security level for a specific resource, just as it is
currently dene today. All information from a single-level
subscriber that enters the LAN, will be protected as if it
were at that level and will not be transmitted to a resource
at a lower security level. This restriction is the same as
that imposed today, except the components operating at the
same system-high security levels may be interconnected. The
difference for the LAN is that the separation between the
security levels is logical rather than physical. Multilevel
resources that are assigned a set of security levels at
which they are allowed to operate are restricted to communi-
cating with other multilevel or single-level resources
withir their range.
The LAN itself is designed to be a passive medium such
as coaxial cable or a twisted pair. The key architectural
elements of the LAN are the trusted interface units (TIUs)
.
The TIUs will maintain separation of information of
different levels, with one TIU associated with each
subscriber or set of subscribers operating at a given
18

TOP SECRET SECRET UNCLASSIFIED MULTILEVEL
MULTILEVEL LOCAL AREA NETWORK
ED
TOP SECRET SECRET UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 4.1 Siiple Multilevel LAN.
security level or range. The TIUs perform a single
security-related function, that is, to label each packet of
cutgcing (subscriber to the LAN) data with the correct
security level of the subscriber and to check the security
labels of incoming packets and compare them against that of
the subscriber. For the case of a single-level subscriber,
cnly one level is allowed and therefore all security
controls (labelling and checking) are built into the TIUs
and the subscribers do not need to be "trusted" to provide
the proper security labels. However, multilevel subscribers
are trusted to specify their cwn security labels within a
specified range. They must also protect incoming data
within that range (the TIUs for those subscribers will
enforce the correct range) .
19

Since there is nc communication across the security
levels in figure 4.1, the logical effect of the LAN is that
cf separate LANs. This architecture provides no benefit
over physically separate LANs that do not require the use of
interface units. There is one main advantage with this
structure and that is the upgrading capability that it poss-
esses. If the architecture shown in figure 4.1 is used as a
basis, then multilevel operation can be achieved via a
series cf small incremental enhancements as development
progresses. Each upgrade can be accomplished without
discarding any existing hardware or software or without
impacting the operation of the system.
The obvious problem with the architecture of figure 4.1
concerns physical protection requirements. It is apparent
that the entire LAN medium and all the TIUs mus+ be
protectee to system-high since all components will contain
systei-high information. This implies that all hosts and
terminals must be protected to system-high (the situation
today) which is not practical. Keeping in mind that the
subscriber-TIU interfaces usually consist of relatively
short cables, the problem that arises is how to connect an
unprotected subscriber to its TIU where the TIU and LAN
medium must reside in a highly protected area.
The solution cencept presented so far ignores very
serious physical constraints on how users and hardware are
protected in a secure environment. Therefore, a more flex-
ible scluticn is required.
B. FULL MULTILEVEL IAH
Figure 4.2 [ Ref . 2: p. 9] illustrates a full multilevel
LAN. The concept is to provide a separate physical sub-LAN
(subnetwork) for each community with different security
protection requirements. Each subnetwork is itself a simple
20

multilevel LAN as depicted in figure 4. 1. This is accom-
plished through the use of bridges constructed as interfaces
between subnetworks. The bridges act as filters for classi-
fied packets of data addressed across subnetwork boundaries.
Although each subnetwork has a maximum security level
associated with it, subnetworks provide full multilevel
protection for all levels below their maximum. Individual
users may operate at levels below the subnetwork maximum,
while maintaining the same restriction that only subscribers
of the same levels can communicate. It is not the intention
cf this design tc provide a subnetwork for every combination
of specific security level and compartment utilized at a
KWMCCS site. The intent is just for one subnetwork for each
environment that is separately physically protected to a
given system-high level.
To clarify this concept, consider host A in figure 4.2.
It is physically protected to the Secret level and it may
run at the Unclassified level, wherein it can communicate
with host B on the Unclassified subnetwork. In order for
host A to run Unclassified it must be appropriately sani-
tized and must have no connections to any secret devices
ether than the TIU tc the subnetwork. Host C illustrates a
subscriber in an Unclassified environment connected to a Top
Secret subnetwork. Because the TIU for host C must be
protected tc Top Secret in order to remain trusted, it is
the only component fcr host C that needs to be within the
Top Secret environment. Host D in the Confidential environ-
ment is configured as a remote from the Secret subnetwork to
which it connects. Here again, the TIU for host D provides
the isolation of the host from data on the subnetwork above
the Ccnfidential level.
Figure 4.2 only illustrates a subnetwork's maximum
level, however the cencept of a subnetwork's minimum level







































3 ><B||B> 8RIDGE. HALF BRIDGES
Figure 4.2 Full Multilevel LAN.
manner as a maximum subnetwork level. A minimum level is
utilized to limit the damage that could be done ty mis-
classifying and mis-icuting a packet of data.
22

Fcr example, if it is known that a certain subnetwork
has a irinimum of Secret, then interfaces to the subnetwork
(bridges and TIUs) wculd assume that all data are at leas-
Secret and will not, or will automatically upgrade any data
labelled at a lower level. A minimum level does net limit
the actual minimum level of data that users can transmit.
It only limits the labels that can be placed on the data by
the netwerk components, and therefore it limits the destina-
tion of the data. Actually, the minimum level of a subnet-
work wculd be greater than Unclassified only if the various
devices protecting the data were not trusted (administra-
tively) tc provide the required protection.
Fcr example, if part of a LAN contained highly sensitive
data which the TIUs and bridges were unable to adequately
protect, then that section of the LAN subnetwork could be
isolated and its use limited to subscribers operating at the
approprate security levels. Users would be able to operate
at all levels on the subnetwork, and be able to communicate
via a bridge to other parts of the LAN. However, no data
leaving the subnetwork could be labelled at a level below
the ninimum level of the subnetwork. If a TIU on the
subnetwork were compromised, the TIUs and bridges that
comprise the rest of the LAN will prevent any data origi-
nating from the subnetwork from travelling to a subscriber,
elsewhere en the LAN, that is not cleared to the appropriate
level, or from arriving on another subnetwork of a lower
level. One point should be explained concerning this last
statement. If the TIUs on the subnetwork are not trusted to
avoid downgrading the information, why should the bridges or
TIUs on the rest of the LAN be trusted not to do the same?
They shouldn't. The lack of trust of the devices on the
subnetwork refers to the type of environment the subnetwork
is located in and the possibility of a lack of complete
trust in the multilevel resources on that subnetwork. An
23

example of this reasoning is a subnetwork running in a
controlled mode where data are labelled by partially trusted
multilevel hosts up through Top Secret, but where the users
cf the subnetwork have a minimum clearance of Secret. The
multilevel host is trusted only to distinguish between
Secret ar.d Top Secret.
Ncte that in figure 4. 2 encryption plays an important
role. Eetween the Secret and Confidential subnetworks and
the Secret and Top Secret subnetworks, the encryption
involves a simple serial bit stream that is link encrypted.
Between the two Tcp Secret subnetworks, the LAN itself
is designed to be encrypted. So far, the complexities of
encrypting a LAN medium have net been studied in detail.
But this should not have a great impact on Sidhu and
Gassers' design, since it does not depend on the ability to
encrypt the LAN medium directly (the two portions could be
physically separate subnetworks connected by bridges).
However, encryption cf the medium is attractive because it
could ninimize the number of separate subnetworks that would






Ihe goals for the fully operational configuration of the
secure LAN, according to S idhu and Gasser, are that it be
able tc maintain separation between classified data and
users that are not cleared tc see that data, and that it
give appropriately cleared users access to data which may
have different classifications. This means that the infor-
maticn irust be maintained by classification in the
computer (s) and that the information be controlled by clas-
sification from the computer to the user. Therefore, the
mature configuration of the secure LAN must be able to
support multilevel computers, multilevel networks, and
nultilevel terminals.
Full multilevel operation of resources at a WIS site
will rot be achieved in the immediate future, no matter what
the multilevel capabilities of the LAN. Therefore, to limit
the risk of constructing a LAN to support full multilevel
resources from the beginning, most resources in the initial
installations will he single-level. In chapter IV the
incremental enhancement of a secure LAN from the simple
version of figure 4. 1 to the multiple version of figure 4.2
was intrcduced. This progressive enhancement was designed
to compensate for physical security installation constraints
at a Wis site. From here on the LAN will be addressed as if
it consisted of multiple subnetworks, with the understanding
that the single- subnetwork version will be an initial capa-
bility fully compatible with the final structure.
Sidhu and Gasser have provided a series of "scenarios"
that preside successively mere flexible and improved multi-
level secure processing capability. The three scenarios,
which are centered around the three versions of the TIU
25

discussed in chapter III, enable capability to start with
the existir.g single-level equipment and grow to a fully
mature multilevel secure configuration. The first scenario
documented in this thesis is expected to be operational
around 1S85 or 1986. The functions in the second and third
scenarios are to be achieved via evolutionary growth. All
of the scenarios are illustrated with multiple subnetworks,
yet any of these scenarios can operate with either the
single or multiple subnetwork versions of the secure LAN.
A. SINGLE-LEVEL RESOURCE SCENARIO
In this scenario it is assumed that all of the resources
are untrusted and therefore single- level. Single-level TIUs
are designed and trusted to ensure that data to and from a
particular resource always have the proper label of the
level cf that resource. In this configuration only bridges
will transmit data of more than one security level.
Figure 5.1 [Ref. 2: p. 23] depicts the single-level
resource scenario: a LAN consisting of Top Secret and
Secret subnetworks, supporting single-level hosts and
single-level terminals. The security level of each subnet-
work is the maximum level of any cf the single-level
subscribers on the subnetwork, and therefore the maximum
level that packets will be labelled on the subnetwork. In
figure 5.1, the Confidential terminal (third from the left)
is able tc access the Confidential host computer (lower
right), the Secret terminals can access the Secret host
computer, and the Tcp Secret terminals can access the Top
Secret ccmputer. The bridge joining the Top Secret subnet-
work and the Secret subnetwork assures that only packets of
a level of Secret or telcw are present on the Secret subnet-
work. The bridge also allows all packets to pass from the






Figure 5.1 Single-level Resource Scenario.
ensuring that their labels are no higher than Secret, but it
does not allow Top Secret packers to pass from the Top
Secret subnetwork to the Secret subnetwork. The Top Secret
subnetwork may also contain Secret or Confidential packets
in addition to Top Secret packets that originated from the
Secret host or Confidential terminal. Note that Secret
packets may contain data below the level of Secret but
cannot be sc marked if the single-level resource from which
it originated cannot be trusted to maintain the separation
and labelling. In the remainder of this thesis there may be
reference to the "level" of a packet as being equivalent to
the value cf some security label on the packet which is not





Id figure 5.1 ncte the connection of Confidential and
Secret terminals and the Secret host to the Top Secret.
subnetwork. If the Secret and Confidential terminals and
Secret host are connected to their TIUs via a short cable,
then there may be a problem concerning different physical
protection requirements where the subscriber, TIU and
subnetwork are concerned (since the TIUs connected to the
lop Secret subnetwork must all be protected to the Top
Secret level) .
E. VJBIflBLE-LEVEL RESOURCE SCENARIO
This scenario, which is depicted in figure 5.2 [Ref. 2:
p. 25], permits the sharing cf data by users at mere than
one security level. This is due to the introduction of
variatle-level trusted interface units that allow a terminal
user tc talk to single-level resources at different levels
up to and including his terminals 1 classification. The
interface units are trusted to the extent that they restrict
the user tc one level at a time since the interfacing
terminal would not be trusted to simultaneously handle
irultilevel data. However, through the use of switching
mechanisms, the level of the terminal, and therefore cf the
TIU, may change under user control in a static manner. For
example, figure 5.2 shows two variable-level TIUs on the Top
Secret network. A subscriber at the "C-TS" terminal could
communicate with either the Confidential, Secret or Top
Secret hosts on either subnetwork through his variable-level
TIU.
A variable-level IIU can be constructed that would work
with a multiple position switch to connect a user's terminal
to one security level or another. However, there could be a
problem in that a user would lose any context that he previ-







































Figure 5.2 Variable-level Resource Scenario,
[Ref. 7: p. **-16] # which allows a two-level switching capa-
bility, are such that there will be a loss of context that
will prcve to be extremely anDoying to an operational user.
The variable-level TIU does not solve this problem but dees
provide a more enhanced capability that would not be
achieved with a single-level TIU.
The variable-level TIU permits a highly classified user
to share lower classified resources with users who are oper-
ating out cf a lower classified area without requiring a
separate terminal fcr the lower classified resources. An
example of this wculd be intelligence users accessing
unclassified or Secret data maintained by logistics
personnel. The shared database would run at the Secret
29

level, and could be physically located on either the Top
Secret or Secret subnetwork . Cross-level transfer of data,
however, would be prohibited.
A variarle-level TIU cculd also be used to interface a
LAN to a host that operates at different levels at different
times (through periods processing).
C. HOLTILEVEL RESOURCE SCENARIO
Figure 5.3 ( Ref - 2: p. 26] illustrates the fully opera-
tional capability of the proposed LAN. A user with a
terminal capable of maintaining the separation of data would
he connected to the LAN via a multilevel TIU in crder to
view and modify data of different levels simultaneously in
connection with terminals that have screens or windows for
each security level. The terminal and the multilevel TIU
coordinate the security level cf each data transfer. Also,
the multilevel TIUs wculd allow multilevel hosts to "simul-
taneously" communicate with various single-level or multi-















This chapter provides the details of the design of a
multilevel secure local area computer network for wis. The
design was approached with the basic requirement that the
LAN allow transmission of data at different security levels
but with appropriate protection of data at each security
level. This requirement was further integrated with ether
requirements such as near-term low-risk feasibility of
implementation and incremental upgrade capabilities.
The full LAN architecture depicted in figure 4.2
consists of several physically separated subnetworks. Sidhu
and Gasser have attempted to maintain the logical view as
that of a single local area network with the underlying
substructure being tctally transparent to the users. The
subnetworks comprising the LAN are themselves local area
networks connected to each ether with bridges. The bridge,
in this architecture, is somewhat similar to a gateway in
the interconnection of wide-area packet-switched networks,
but it is expected to be much simpler. Even though a bridge
is simpler than a gateway, it is more complex than a
repeater that might fce used to boost signals in an Ethernet
[Ref. 9]. A bridge accepts packets from one network and
broadcasts it onto the medium of one of the other local area
retwerks tc which it is connected. The LAN design under
review has been simplified such that the bridge connects
just two local area networks to each other. A possible
upgrade option would be the connection of several subnet-
works to a single bridge. A brief summary follows before
proceeding with the detailed design work.
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Each subnetwork has a security level associated with it
which is the level of the protected environment in which it
physically resides. Each subnetwork will only carry infor-
mation with a security level equal to, or less than, the
security level cf the subnetwork. It may also have a
minimum level that is the minimum level at which data in the
subnetwork will be labelled. The bridges and trusted inter-
face units will enforce the minima and maxima. Data passing
through an unprotected environment must be encrypted to
provide protection against passive wiretapping.
The local area network shown in figure 4.2 has the
following additional benefits besides meeting the basic
security related requirements:
a. It will allcw reconfiguration with minimal disrup-
tion of service within a fixed security environment.
b. It will allow user separation by communities of
interest and information flow, as well as by security
levels.
c. It will allcw for data security by physical separa-
tion of data flew.
d. By limiting the effect of failures and denial-cf-
service attacks to a single subnetwork, it will enhance
reliability.
To begin a lcok at the detailed design work, a specific
set cf LAN protocols must be examined. Most cf the protocol
issues in this design center around the access metheds used
by TIUs tc interface to the LAN medium. For this access
protocol, the authors chose a tasic contention-type prctocol
similar tc the "carrier-sense multiple access with collision
detection" (CSJiA/CD) protocols that are currently being used
in lecal area networks such as Ethernet [Ref. 10: p.
395-404]. They have further incorporated the relevant
features of the CSMA/CD access method of the proposed IEEE
602 standard for local area networks [Ref. 11].
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Sidhu and Gassers 1 reason for choosing CSMA/CD is to
show how the secure IAN architecture could be implemented
using at least one well-specified and currently implemented
protocol (even though the IEEE version of CSMA/CD is now
only a proposal, they felt the Ethernet protocol is suffi-
ciently similar to be considered a representative iaplemen-
taticn) . The architecture in figure 4.2 dees not depend on
CSMA/CD or any other specific protocol. To go beyond the
superficial level of detail of figure 4.2, however, a
specific protocol must be chosen around which to base
further design. The authors do not preclude the use of
ether protocols to build a secure LAN, but the use of a
protocol substantially different from CSMA/CD could possibly
require significant changes to much of the design detail to
follow.
It should be noted and stressed that, while slightly
different versions of CSMA/CD could be used in the various
subnetworks with minimal impact, the concept is not suitable
for interconnection cf CSMA/CD subnetworks with subnetworks
using ncn-contention type protocols such as switched line,
token passing rings, etc. If subnetworks based on ncn-
contenticn technology were included it would probably add
considerable complexity to the protocol architecture,
particularly in the bridges which must deal with protocol
conversion. However, a different design could be used based
entirely en non-contention protocols.
The authors point out three features of their architec-
ture that are not yet commonly employed in existing commer-
cial LANs:
(1) The use of bridges to connect subnetworks (a few
commercial offerings have recently emerged in this
area)
.




(3) The labelling of packets according to a security
level.
For the single-level resource scenario (1985-86 time frame),
the first two features will be shown to be rather straight-
forward to implement with only a small change to existing
components while the last feature is moderately mere
complex. Subsequent evolution will require further develop-
ment in all three areas.
The remainder cf this chapter will discuss briefly
certair considerations such as the level of interconnection
cf subnetworks, addressing, security and routing. Details
of the design for the LAN protocols, interface units,
bridges, and flow and congestion ccntrol will then be
presented.
!• IEYEI CF INTERCOBHECTIOH
Cne important issue in designing the bridges (used to
interconnect subnetworks) is the protocol layer at which
subnetworks are to be connected [Ref. 12: p. 1386-1407] and
[Ref. 13: pp. 175-195]. A bridge can play the role as an
interface unit or as a host. Since the authors are assuming
a common LAN technology (suitable broadcast medium) with
identical protocols iirplemented in all the subnetworks, the
most natural choice cf network interconnection is at the
interface unit layer. This would in turn imply that the
bridge does not implement a protocol lying at a layer higher
than the prctocols iiplemented in the interface units.
E. AEDBESSING, SECOBITI AID BOOTING
A twc-level hierarchical addressing scheme is specified
for addressing subscribers in the LAN. Therefore an address
cf a subscriber will have two parts: the first part identi-
fies a particular subnetwork, and the second part gives the
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address cf the subscriber en the subnetwork. All routing
information will be stored in the bridges for data going
across several subnetworks (this is due to the fact that
information must be available to direct the data to the
desired destination along seme optimal path).
Addressing and routing both have implications for data
security. The sender TIU inserts the destinaticn address
and security level cf the data in the header part of the
packet. The TIU, whether single-level, variable- level , or
nultilevei, is trusted to assign the correct security level
cf the subscriber to the packet. A data packet en rcute may
pass thrcugh one or more bridges. Each bridge must decide
if the packet should be broadcast on the second subnetwork.
At least part of the routing mechanism of the bridges must
be trusted since a packet of a given security level must not
appear en a subnetwork of a lower security level. The
receiving TIU is trusted tc pass the data to its receiver
enly if the receiver's security level is greater than or
equal to the security level of the packet.
The hierarchical addressing scheme and the use cf a
security field in the packet have a definite effect on the
protoccls of the LAN and the hardware and software that will
support these prctoccls.
C. FiCTCCOIS
In crder for the IAN of figure 4.2 to perform its commu-
nication service, communication protocols implemented in the
TIUs and bridges must perform a variety of basic functions.
Since security and bridges have been added to the "usual"




The protocols have been arbitrarily divided into two
groups: low layer and high layer. The protocols in the low
layer group perform functions of layer 1,2 and 3 protocols
in the ISO Reference Model [ Ref . 14: pp. 81-118]. For
example, they provide procedures for transporting packets
from a sender to receiver within the LAN. Note that
protocol "layers" is used instead of "levels" simply to
avoid confusion with security "levels". The layer 1
protocol is the physical layer protocol and specifies char-
acteristics such as voltages, timing, data encoding and
decoding, etc., for the transmission medium.
The layer 2 protccol (link protocol) specifies hew two
physically connected devices (e.g., host-TIU or 1I0-TIU)
communicate. For our LAN the layer 2 protocol is the
TIU-LAN access protocol, implemented in the interface units,
that allcws interface units (and bridges) to communicate.
The design of the layer 2 protocol is based en the proposed
IEEE standard 80 2 CSMA/CD protocol. This version of CSMA/CD
provides a broadcast capability and implements collision
detection due to simultaneous transmissions, and retransmis-
sions when the medium is not in use. It also retransmits
when the receiver dees net receive an acknowledgement.
Since a packet that is successfully transmitted and deliv-
ered may still
.
be discarded on detection of a transmission
error, the service picvided by this protocol is like a data-
gram service (e.g., there is no assurance that correct data
will te delivered to the receiver (s) ) . Therefore, a frame
check sequence field in the CSMA/CD link layer protocol is
used to detect a damaged packet so that the packet is
assured correct if received.
The layer 3 protccol is the network layer protocol. It
provides a means fcr data delivery across networks or
subnetworks. The layer 3 protocol is usually nonexistent
for single-network LANs (or else it is merged with layer 2)
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since ttere is no cognizance of a "network" as separate from
the interface units themselves. However, this laysr may
include a sublayer function to provide transmission of
packets through an interconnected system of computer
networks. Most of this design involves only the layer 2
CSMA/CD protocol where the intersubnetworking function is
subsumed in CSMA/CD and transparent to any additional inter-
networking functions in layer 3. The following paragraphs
illustrate the more in-depth design details concerning the
low layer protocols.
1
- I^ii Layer Protocols
The physical layer 1 protocol of the proposed
CSMA/CD IEEE 802 standard can be used in this LAN unchanged.
Layer 2 cf the CSMA/CD protocol requires some changes in the
frame format and procedure parameters to adapt the secure
LAN architecture. It is in this layer where the security
considerations have the greatest impact on the protocols. A
data security level field will have to be added and the
source and destination addresses will have to be modified to
reflect the two-component nature of an address (local
network number, TIU address) . In figure 6. 1 the IEEE
CSMA/CD link layer frame format is shown for comparison with
the authors' proposed changes [Ref. 2: p. 34], The numbers
at the left of each format indicate the number of bytes
comprising the field. The importance here is not the exact
number of bytes in each field but rather the differences
tetween the "standard" protocol and the proposed secure LAN
versicn. The following is an interpretation of the fields
of figure 6. 1 (b) :
Destination Subnet Number: 1 byte




function: Address on the subnetwork of the TIU
receiving the frame


















Source Subnet Number: 1 byte
function: Source local subnetwork number
Source: 6 bytes
function: Address on the subnetwork of the TIU
sending the frame
Security Level: 2 bytes
function: Security level of the data part in
the frame
Data: Variable (up to some maximum) number of bytes
function: Data in a fully transparent form,
i.e., any bit sequence is allowed
Frame Check Sequence: 4 bytes
function: Contains cyclic redundancy check
(CRC) value computed over all the fields
Note that tte length of the basic header of the
frame is the same as in the IEEE 802 specification except
that the header has teen extended by usurping part cf the
data field for the security level. Also the address fields
have teen subdivided to incorporate the subnetwork number
rather than adding mere fields. The particular positions of
the new fields were chosen to make maximum use of antici-
pated off-the-shelf components and well-tested concepts in
the design of the secure LAN. The reasoning for the posi-
tions cf these fields will be discussed further when the TIU
design details are presented.
The CSMA/CD link layer protocol allows two types of
addressing called physical and multicast addressing. The
physical address is the unique address of a station whereas
the multicast address is either a multicast-group address or
broadcast address. A broadcast address is meant tc denote
all the stations on the LAN, and a multicast address is
associated with a grcup cf stations on the LAN. A number of
conventions may be implemented to distinguish the different
types of addresses. In the secure LAN, multicast addressing
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can fc€ allowed for stations on a single subnetwork by
adopting similar conventions in the destination field of the
secure LAN link protocol. However, in order to allow multi-
cast (gioup or broadcast) addressing throughout all the
subnetworks in the secure LAN, the bridge design would be
sonewhat ccirplex. Also, only unclassified sources could
address a packet to all destinations in a multilevel LAN.
Sidhu and Gasser do net address the "full" multicast exten-
sion at this time.
It should be noted that since the security label is
part cf the CSMA/CD protocol, the part of the TIU respon-
sible for maintaining the integrity of the CSMA/CD header
must be trusted. Various aspects of handling CSMA/CD or
higher layer protocols (including getting data within the
packet transmitted prcperly) need not be subject to rigorous
contrcls placed en the development of trusted systems. This
is the authors* motivation for the separation of functions
that «ill fce discussed later.
CSMA/CD alone is not generally suitable fcr inter-
networking, however, for this secure LAN architecture the
authors felt that the capabilities of CSMA/CD are adequate
for communication ameng subscribers among a small number of
subnetworks. The authors see the usa of CSMA/CD alone as
one cf the means by which the design can be made simple and
implementable in the near-term, especially considering the
additional requirements that must be imposed on the imple-
mentation cf trusted systems. However, in the long term as
traffic load increases and the number of subnetworks grows,
congestion and bottlenecks may require a more powerful
protcccl appropriate to internetworking.
This security architecture does not depend on any
particular network layer protocol, however the authcrs
recommend the use of the DoD Internet Protocol (IP), or an
enhanced version of IP as outlined in Skeltons' report
41

[Ref. 15] which takes into account some characteristics of
local area networks. IP provides a primitive form of
congestion control. By considering a change to a new
protocol now, the appropriate mechanisms can be employed to
allow for future enhancement without any impact on the users
of the LAN. For this upgrade of the CSMA/CD protocol it
would be reasonable to merge CSMA/CD with limited portions
of IF responsible for addressing, security, and congestion
control, so that the separate subnetworks in the secure LAN
would be treated as separated networks by the merged
CSMA/CD-IP protocol. This simplifies the security issue
somewhat and might pcssibly minimize congestion problems in
the bridges as the lead on the LAN increases. More comments
on IF are provided in section F.
2 • Hi2.h L^xer Protocols
Ihis group consists of protocols at layer 4 and
above in the ISO model. They use the services of the lower
layer protocols and in turn provide value added services to
a protoccl layer or user abeve. For instance, if a reliable
end-to-end data transfer service is required, it is provided
by a data transfer protocol in this group using a suitable
end-tc-end acknowledgement scheme. Various other features
that can be built intc high layer protocols are retransmis-
sion en time-out, sequenced delivery of packets, flow and
congestion control, etc. In general, the secure LAN design
does not depend on cr affect these high layer protocols in
any way, however conents will be made regarding the use of
DoD standards for the host-to-host protocols, the
Transmission Control [Ref. 16] and Internet [Ref. 17]
Erotocols (TCP/IP). It should be noted here that IP dees
not fit neatly into a specific layer of the ISO reference
modal because it lies somewhere within or below TCP (which
is at layer 4) and atcve the link layer, therefore making it
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a "low layer" prctoccl. The low layer protocols previously
discussed provide the basic transport mechanism for moving
data fcetween TIU's ir. the LAN and through the bridges. The
protocols together provide a service that can be used to
support a variety of high layer protocols depending on the
applications. Not€ That lower layer protocols do not
provide assurance that packets will be delivered or that
they will te delivered in the order in which they are trans-
mitted. There is also no automatic end-to-end acknowledge-
ment for successfully delivered packets. If any of these
features are desired they must be based on a suitable high
layer protocol.
In order to achieve reliable and in-order data
delivery at a destination in the LAN, TCP can be implemented
en the network layer protocol. IP and TCP are DoD standard
protocols for a "catenet" (an interconnected system of
packet switched computer communication networks) [Eef. 18:
pp. 287-305]. In the catenet environment, IP provides a
datagram service from a source to a destination host. It
also provides for fragmentation and reassembly of long data-
grams for transmission through networks with small packet
sizes. TCP is a connection oriented, end-to-end reliable
host-to-host protocol for data delivery. It provides for
recovery from lost, damaged, duplicated and out-of-order
delivered data by underlying less reliable media. The
sending TCP assigns a sequence number to each transmitted
packet and requires a positive acknowledgement (ACK) from
the receiving TCP. If this ACK is not received in a speci-
fied time out interval, then the sending TCP assumes that
the packet is lost and retransmits it. The sequence
numbers are also used for detecting duplicate or out-cf-
crder packets. A checksum routine is used to detect damaged
packets (ncte also that the CSMA/CD protocol already detects
damaged packets with its frame check) . TCP also has a
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"window" mechanism fcr flow control that regulates the data
flow tetween source and destination.
Sidhu and Gasser mention TCP, not only because it is
a DoC standard and therefore likely to be used for wide-area
networks, tut because they feel it will be suitable fcr use
in a LAN as well. Since users of the LAN will have a need
to access TCP-based systems on wide-area networks via a
gateway, great difficulties in compatibility can be avoided
if the protocols used by subscribers throughout the LAN are
also TCP and IP.
Sidhu and Gasser also point out that all higher
layer protocols, including TCP, are unaffected by their
secure LAN design, however it is important to note seme
potential problems that may cccur with certain inplementa-
tions . There is an cptions field in the header of the I?
and one of the cptiens may be the security label fcr the
packet. Also, higher layer protocols may include such
labelling. But, the authors have designed the secure LAN
such that it uses a security label in the low layer
(CSMA/CD) protocol instead. Anything above layer 2 is
simply data to the CSMA/CD protocol and is ignored by the
trusted portions of the TIU
.
If an untrusted single-level
host created that data and is responsible for handling the
TCP and IP protocol, then any higher layer security labels
cannot be believed by the trusted CSMA/CD protocol handler
in the TIU. Therefore, for the single-level and variable-
level resource scenarios discussed in chapter V, which allow
enly single-level hosts, there is no problem in ignoring the
IP or higher layer security labels and using only the
security labels in the CSMA/CD layer protocol. The security
level in the IP header might be used to specify the "real"
level of the data contained in a packet labelled by a
single-level TIU at a higher level, but then administrative




The multilevel resource scenario requires the
ability to support multilevel hosts. In this environment a
multilevel host will "choose" the security level cf each
packet it sends, and this level must be believed by the TIU f
at least within the range of allowable values. Usually
multilevel hosts sucport several processes running at
different security levels en a single operating system.
Therefore, the security level of a packet depends on the
level of the process that: sent that packet and is inserted
into the packet by the trusted operating system of the host.
For hosts that have TCP this security level would mere than
likely be associated with the TCP protocol layer, since the
TCP is the layer at which processes are identified.
If a host has TCP, then the fully formed TCP packets
are transferred into the TIU with some control information
so that the low layer protocol envelope can be created. If
TCP were to be implemented in the TIU then the same thing
happens tut within the TIU itself (the host just transfers
"raw" data plus some ccntrol information to the TIU sc that
the proper TCP packets are created by the TIU). In either
case, there must be seme means by which security information
known to the TCP implementation is transmitted to the lower
layer protocols for the labels that are the basis for
security markings in the LAN.
If the IP and CSMA/CD protocols were to examine
security labels in the headers of higher layer protocols,
then this would be a violation cf the ISO concept of separa-
tion cf prctocol layers (lower layer protocols are not
supposed to knew afceut the TCP formats) . Instead, the
security label would have to be passed along as ccntrol
information (an additional parameter) from the high layer
software to the lowest layer interface. Sidhu and Gassers 1
concept appears workable, however it is still not very clean
as it requires information relevant to the high layer data
to beccme part of the low layer protocol.
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For eventual upgrading to combine IP with CSMA/CD,
the security label problem is somewhat simplified because
the label already in the IP options field could be utilized.
Eut this dees not fully eliminate the problem where the
security information originates above the TCP layer.
E. 1B0S1ED INTERFACE UHIT (TIO)
The single-level architecture is emphasized in this
chapter. Although tfce most detailed design is presented for
the sirgle resource scenario, enhancements will be discussed
for the remaining twe scenarios. The major goal in this
architecture has been to provide a distinct red/black sepa-
ration within the TIU and to minimize the complexity and
size cf the mechanism in the red area that is responsible
for maintaining security. In conventional red/black separa-
tion devices, there is a crypto unit between the two sides.
Usually, neither the red nor the black side is responsible
for maintaining security, and if either fails it is unlikely
that the crypto unit will pass intelligible data. In cur
TIU, the red side must be "trusted" to work properly, cr at
least to prevent accidental disclosure of data, despite the
possibility of hardware failure. Note that the concept of
"red/black" with respect to the TIU refers to multilevel
(trusted) vs. single-level (untrusted) rather than to clas-
sified vs. unclassified. The analogy between the two is
useful, however, as the single-level portion may be unclas-
sified, but it might also be classified at any level at or
below the maximum of the multilevel subnetwork to which the
TIU is attached. In any case, the single-level part dees
not need to be trusted. For many cases, such as TIUs
serving Top Secret subscribers on a Top Secret network,
significant cost savings may be realized by providing
non-TEMPEST versions cf TIUs.
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Sidhu and Gasser strongly stress their motivation for
minimizing the amount of mechanism in the TIU requiring
trust. TIUs may be quite complex and research has demon-
strated the feasibility of implementing most of the TCP/IP
in the LAN interface units [Ref. 15]. They do not expect
that it will be possible to adequately verify a large body
of software or firmware such as the TCP/IP in the time frame
required for the single-lavel and variable-level scenarios.
The verification process is in support of certification (the
technical process whereby a procedure, program, system
component, cr system (s) are shown to be secure; i.e., that
the security design specifications are correct and have been
properly implemented [Ref. 19: p. C-2 ] ) of the TIU for a
multilevel IAN application. Therefore, the less software,
firmware, and overall hardware mechanisms that must be
trusted, the greater the probability that certification for
multilevel operation will be achieved. The feasibility of
implementing a single-level TIU is based on the rather
trivial increase in functionality required over that of a
conventional interface unit (as previously demonstrated by
the CSMA/CB protocol modifications discussed earlier). A
simpler option would be to build "untrusted" interface
units, implementing the full required functionality, rather
than going with the trusted TIUs that could be built today.
The detailed TIU is considered more of a technical challenge
only tecause of the red/black cr trusted/un trusted separa-
tion requirement.
1 - Single-Level TIU
Figure 6.2 [Ref. 2: p. 43] depicts the architecture
of the single-level TIU. The details in the figure have not
been worked out to date. The design is not dependent on
whether the LAN is broadband or baseband, but it does depend
on the use of a CSMA/CD protocol. It is also not dependent
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en whetter a "two cable" (separate inbound and outbound












Figure 6.2 Trusted Interface Onit (TID) Architecture.
The dotted line denotes the portions of the LAN and
the LAN medium that carry multilevel data. The TIC is
termed "single-level" because it allows its subscribers to
send cr receive data at only one specific security level,
the level being determined during manufacture of the red
side circuitry or by some maintenance function en the red
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side. The red side cf the TIU is actually multilevel secure
in the sense that it sorts out the single-level data from
multilevel data received frcra the LAN medium, and is subject
to the controls necessary for trusted multilevel operation.
Pour components reside within the red area; all
physically protected to the highest level of the subnetwork:
IAN med ium : This is in the red because it carries
multilevel data in the clear. It is a passive cable
where the only "failure" could be denial cf service
rather than compromise.
Interface: This pcrtion of the TIU provides the
physical interface to the cable. This is a passive
system and cculd fail by denying service to the
subscriber at this TIU.
CSMA/CD: This is the hardware that implements mcst
cf the CSMA/CD prctcccl and destination address
reccgnition. For IEEE 802 and similar protcccls
such as Ethernet, the authors expect that off-the-
shelf hardware will be available to provide most of
the logic to recognize valid incoming packets
destined for this TIU and to handle the contention
and retransmission algorithms necessary to service
an outbound packet. Ihis hardware may also handle
frame check en inbound and outbound packets and
notify the security processor when a valid packet
has been received or transmitted. Note that the
CSMA/CD component must be trusted to leave unmodi-
fied the security field of the packet. If it should
make an errcr in address recognition, the only
compromise will be need-to-know. if it should make
an error in recognizing the frame check (i.e.,
accepts a packet as valid despite an incorrect frame
check) , a compromise due to receipt of an
as

incorrectly marked classified packet is highly
unlikely due to the other checks that are made by
the CSMA/CD interface and security processor. This
design should be fully compatable with off-the-shelf
components because the overall packet format and the
fields used by possible "standard" CSMA/CD inter-
faces 'are left unchanged. The source and destina-
tion addresses are treated as single fields tc the
CSMA/CD interface
—
the two-part addressing structure
is interpreted only by the bridges. The security
level field is ignored by the CSMA/CD interface as
if it were part of the "data".
Sec uri ty Processor: The sole purpose of this compo-
nent is to examine the security level field of
incoming packets for legal values and to insert the
correct security level into that field on outgoing
packets. A received packet that gets past the
CSMA/CD component (because the packet has the
correct destination address) but has the wrong
security level, will be rejected by the security
processor. The security processor can be set to
accept a certain range of values for incoming levels
including only one specific level. However, because
the single-level TIU assumes that nothing outside
the red area is trusted, secure communications can
cnly take place at a single-level.
Contained in the black area of the TIU are a CPU,
memory and I/O ports. That part of the CSMA/CD protocol not
respcnsitle for maintaining the header and security label
integrity may be implemented in the black area if it can be
conveniently separated from the CSMA/CD processor. Because
the black area deals only with data of a single security
level, it need not be trusted and can be as complex as
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desired. Even if the black TIU software contained a "Trojan
Horse" attempting tc exploit a covert channel, [Ref. 20: pp.
613-615] it would not he able to transmit data on the LAN to
a destination of the wrong level, or to receive data from
the LAN cf the wrong level. Proper implementation consider-
ations should insure that even timing channels could not be
exploited ty untrusted software in the TIU or interfacing
host
.
Cue to the high data rate possible or. a LAN, it
should he stressed that covert and timing channels, if
exploitahle, may prcvide illicit high bandwidth communica-
tions paths that ma j not normally be important for slower
communications media such as packet-switched networks.
Unless all the interfacing hosts can be certified net to
contain subversive (Trojan Horse) software, adequate
security is not provided by a LAN unless these covert chan-
nels are closed. The authors feel that the secure LAN
architecture presented here does close channels for all
practical purposes.
Eackets coming into the TIU from the LAN will arrive
hit-serially. The off-the-shelf CS MA/CD hardware will be
designed tc dump data cne byte at a time into a micropro-
cessor memory with little buffering in the CSMA/CD hardware
itself. Also, the CSMA/CD hardware checks the destination
address "en the fly". If the destination is incorrect, the
rest of the packet is ignored (not dumped into memory) and
the CEU is not notified. If the address is correct, the
remainder cf the packet gets deposited until the frame check
at the end. The CFU is notified of correct receipt only
after the frame check is determined to be correct.
The security processor must work in conjunction with
the CSMA/CD hardware, but it looks only at the security
level field. It will refuse to pass further bytes of
incoming data from a packet if the security level in the
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header is incorrect, otherwise it transparently passes all
data. To find the security level field, it must recognize
the start cf a frame. On output, it has the option of
setting the security level to a particular value or checking
that the value inserted by the CPU is correct before
transmitting.
If the security processor and CSMA/CD hardware are
allowed to dump incoming packets into the microprocessor
memory en the fly before the packet is determined to be
legal, it is possible -chat several bytes might be dumped
before the packet is recognized as not being for the current
recipient of the wrcrg security level. If this were to
cccur, then a Trojan Horse in the untrusted CPU could
attempt to read partially- accepted packets even if the CPU
is net notified of correct receipt of data. However, the
possibility of compromise would be limited to information
that could be communicated via a covert channel in the
header of the packet because the remainder of an unaccep-
table packet does net appear in memory at all. Given these
concerns and the fact that the authors are assuming totally
untrusted software in the black side of all TIUs, it is
necessary tc protect against this threat by buffering, in
the red area (probably in the security processor) , the first
several bytes of the packet until the packet header is
determined to be valid. This buffering could be accom-
plished in the form cf a shift register the length of the
header up tc the security field, so that the first byte dees
not enter the memory until the header is read.
Note here that even if the header is buffered and
loaded into memory only when the security level is valid,
there is a possibility that the packet might still be in
error, and that error would not be detected until the frame
check is read. If this were to happen, a complete erroneous
packet tiould be sitting in memory for the CPU to read.
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However, it is highly unlikely that both the destination and
security level will check out correctly if the packet was in
error and net intended for the designated recipient. If a
trusted mechanism inserts the security level into ^he orig-
inal jacket, it would be almost impossible for untrusted
mechanisms to exploit random line noises in an attempt to
send a packet to an unauthcri2ed destination. This cannot
be considered a useful information channel since it cannot
be controlled in any reliable manner.
Cn a CSMA/CE network there may be many illegal
packets received due to collisions. It is therefore
possible that a packet from a low security level TIU can
collide with a transmission from a high level TIU, yielding
a packet containing a mixture of levels. However, if the
authors' trusted CSMA/CD hardware works correctly, and if
the network is correctly configured according to the
distance, spacing, and other electrical requirements of the
hardware and medium, all collisions will be detected before
the field containing the security level is reached. A tasic
tenet of CSMA/CD protocols is that collisions can only occur
during the transmission of the first several bytes of data.
All transmitting TIUs sensing a collision should stop trans-
mitting fcell before they begin to send the data field of the
packet, and the "listen before talk" concept prevents a TIU
from transmitting in the middle of another TIU's data field.
Therefore, the naximum amount of high security level infor-
mation that could be mixed in with a lew level packet would
be the destination and probably the source fields.
Utilizing the authors' header buffering scheme in the
security processor, any collision would occur well before
any of the high level data was loaded into memory. Even if
a malfunction prevents the transmitting TIUs from stopping
at a collision, it is unlikely that the garbled security
level field will be acceptable to the receiving TIU. The
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use of suitable encoding of values in the security level can
further niriimize the chance of error. Also, auditing can
detect such malfunctions.
In this initial version a TCP and IP implementation
in the TIO will te located in the untrusted portions. If IP
were to be further integrated into CSMA/CD, at least a
portion of it would have to be contained within the security
perimeter.
2- Variable-Level TIP
Since there fcill be a need in the WIS community for
terminals tc run at a variety of levels, a minor enhancement
to the security processor in the TIO could be performed tc
accommodate this "variable-level" capability. The authors
propose the use of a rotary switch hardwired to the red side
cf the TIO so that the user can manually select the level at
which he intends to cterate. It is assumed, that the user is
cleared tc access any security level available on the
switch. The only purpose cf the switch is tc allow the
security processor tc receive and transmit properly marked
data at a level belcw the maximum of the TIO. Since the
black side of the TIO that reads terminal input is not
trusted, the security level cannot be entered from the
terminal keyboard as "normal" keystrokes. Ncte that if the
user forgets to set the rotary switch to the correct level
of the destination with which he is communicating, communi-
cation will fail. Consideration should be given to the fact
that any change of the switch position (to a lower security
level) must result in an automatic reset of the fclack
portion of the TIO and clearing of all its buffers and
memory. It can be seen that this variable-level capability
would not function well in support of the user who must
rapidly switch between levels. This switching option really
cnly supports the ability tc logon and communicate with cne
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single-level host at a time as does the single-level TIU.
It does, however, avcid the need for separate TIUs or teriri-
nals for the different levels at which a user might want to
logon,
Sidhu and Gasser have ignored the issue of hew to
manage the terminals that are connected to these variable-
level TIGs. To enforce security it is necessary that any
memory in a terminal be scrubbed in a prescribed manner
before lowering the level of a terminal. This may be admin-
istratively handled as a manual procedure reguired at each
level change, but the ease of turning a rotary switch on the
TIU might dictate mere automatic scrubbing of the terminal
linked tc the switch or controlled by the TIU itself to
protect against human error. The overall problem here is
how tc appropriately deal with the additional flexibility
afforded by the variable-level TIUs without increasing the
risk of accidental compromise by the user.
3- Multilevel tiu
A true multilevel TIU would allow the subscriber to
make packet-by- packet decisions as to what the level should
be and would receive packets of a range of levels, marking
them aj piopriately in a trusted manner. If the security
level decisions and packet markings were specified by mecha-
nisms outside the TIU (e.g. , multilevel host TCP) , then the
entire TIU must be considered trus-ed and in the red. This
would then make the security processor redundant unless the
LAN contains information of levels outside the multilevel
host range. Formal certification of a considerable amount
cf TIU software might be reguired, depending on the
complexity cf the protocols implemented in the TIU. For
TIUs that implement complex functions it may be possible to
construct a TIU that has a form of hardware and software
protection so that part of the TIU can be trusted and part
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untrusted, similar to what is done for trusted operating
systems. Further study is needed to determine whether
building and trusting such a protection mechanism is simpler
than tfci effort to build and trust the entire TIU. Building
a multilevel TIU is the least of the problems in achieving a
general nultilevel computing capability because trusted
hosts and multilevel terminals must be available first.
E. EBIDGES
Since a bridce is to examine the packet headers created
by the TIUs, the bridge has a TlU-type interface on each of
the networks to which it is attached and implements TIU
protocols. Each bridge also recognizes the destination
address cf packets passing by on its respective subnetworks.
In general, bridces must pass multilevel data frcm cne
multilevel subnetwork to another, therefore there is little
motivaticn for providing simple red/black separation as in
the TIUs (unless one of the subnetworks is single-level).
The authors envision the bridge to consist entirely of
trusted hardware and software. The architecture for a
bridge cculd be constructed that would allow at least seme
cf the internal functions tc be untrusted, but their design
is simple enough so that an additional mechansim tc separate
the trusted and untrusted portions is probably unwarranted.
This is especially true because it is expected that the
bridge will work at the protocol layer in the TIU at which
the trusted TIU functions (security processor and CSMA/CD
protocol handler) already operate, thereby allowing the
explcitaticn of similar mechanisms.
First the full bridge that implements only the CSMA/CD
and physical layer prctocols will be discussed. Figure 6.3
[Bef. 2: p. 48] represents the logical structure of the
bridge, interposed between two subnetworks. The figure
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shows tfc€ flow of packets as they arrive from one subnetwork
on the left and are sent to the ether on the right. This is
a "half-duplex" illustration (the entire bridge consists of
two identical structures of figure 6.3 for full duplex oper-
ation), although in reality seme of the hardware (i.e.,
CSMA/CD interface on each side) might be shared for both
directions as in a TIU. Note that the half-duplex bridge is
not the same as the half-bridge as illustrated in figure
4.2.
The bridge construction is similar to two TIOs tack-to-
tack with modified address selection and security processor
mechanisms. A buffer at least large enough to hold one
complete maximum size packet in each direction is necessary
tecause the CSMA/CD protocol reguires the ability to retain
the packet for retransmission when a collision occurs. To
ensure greater reliability, there should be several packet
tuffers en the transmit side so that temporary congestion en
the receiving subnetwork can be smoothed out. Multiple
receiving tuffers could also be used to take care of tempo-
rary bursts of packets arriving faster than the bridge can
process them. Note that this buffering capacity will net be
able to take care cf one subnetworks 1 consistently being
unable to accept data as fast as another subnetwork is
sending, since such tuffers would quickly fill up. Only
temporary overloads can be handled. This buffering capa-
bility does allcw the use of a slower processor in the
bridge that is only capable of handling an average lead
rather than the peak load without any noticeable degradation
of service.
Packets broadcast on the sending subnetwork arrive at
the bridge (upper left of figure 6.3), and are selected for
acceptance into the input buffers based on the destination
field in the header and the routing table within the bridge



























Figure 6.3 Bridge architecture (Half-Duplex).
that there will be a high vclume of traffic local tc the
subnetwcrk (not destined for another subnetwork) , therefore
it seems reasonable to reject packets not requiring rcutng
before buffering them in the bridge. The authors contend
that the part cf tfce CSMA/CD interface that checks the
dest inaticn field will be different from that in a TIU,
because a set of destinations, stored in the routing table,
is checked. This may require CSMA/CD hardware, rather than
cff-tt e-shelf parts, contrary to the authors' premise of
utilizing available materials. It should be possible to
perform the routing table look "on the fly" without addi-
tional buffering, sirce only a small number of subnetworks
are expected at any given LAN site and the subnetwork number
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is an explicit part cf the destination field. If the inpu-1:
tuffers should fill to capacity, then the CSMA/CD interface
could be turned off sc that all packets are simply rejected,
which is sinilar to what the TIU does when its buffers are
full.
The packets that have been buffered on the input side
are then processed by the bridge for security restrictions,
and the acceptable packets that satisfy all the security
checks are placed into the output buffers fcr transmission
without further irodif ication of any of their fields.
Note that because the bridge only implements CSMA/CD,
requiring no acknowledgement or reply of any kind, there
need not be a logical cr physical connection between the two
half-duplex portions cf the bridge. Therefore, one option
to enhance perfcrmar.ee might be to limit each bridge to
half-duplex operation; twe such bridges would be required
between each pair of subnetworks.
1 • Sec urity Proce ssin g
The major part of the bridqe processing is in the
security processing, not in the routing, which is done
before input buffering by selective acceptance of packets.
Packets removed from the input buffer are examined by the
bridges* security prccessor fcr acceptable security level
fields based on both the receiving and sending subnetworks*
security levels. It enforces both minimum and maximum
levels. Packets arriving at the bridge must be marked at
least at the oiniiium level of the sending subnetwork.
Packets marked below that minimum would either be upgraded
by the bridge or rejected and audited as illegal. If a
packet *ere audited as illegal then it was probably
warranted as a marking that is too low as a result of a
faulty TIU cr configuration problem, or an indication of a
hardware penetration attempt. However, auditing would
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probatly be more efficiently implemented by a special
"security-match" TIU that scans all packets rather than by
the bridge. Packets above the maximum of the sending
subnetwork should also be audited, but in any case they
should not be downgraded due to the possibility that a
configuration error iray cause data of too high a level to be
placed on the sending subnetwork. The checks with respect
to the iririmum and maximum levels of the receiving subnet-
work are similar, except that, if the packet is cut of
range, it is not necessarily due to a fault in a TIU or
configur aticn problem. The sender may simply have mis-
addressed the packet to a receiver on the wrong subnetwork.
In scire cases it maj be acceptable for a low level TIU to
send a packet to a high level TIU for certain applications.
Such a packet may have to be upgraded by the bridge tc the
minimum level of the receiving subnetwork, but it should be
able tc te read by the destination TIU without any security
problems.
Since it is possible for the bridge to know the
security level cf the final destination subnetwork and to
compare that level with the security level of the packet,
there appears to be nc reason for added complexity to check
any mere than the level of the next subnetwork to which the
packet is forwarded. This is especially true since the
destination TIU or last bridge in the sequence must make the
final security check anyway. Therefore, the bridges' knowl-
edge cf the subnetwerk structure of the LAN need not go
further than the two subnetworks to which it is connected.
Since the authors indicate that, for expedience, it
probatly will be necessary to trust the entire bridge, the
enly part of the bridge that actually enforces security is
the security processor. Therefore, the routing, transmis-
sion and buffering mechanisms need only be trusted net to
modify any of the packet information. Once the security
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processor has accepted a packet, mis-routing (to the wrong
1IU) cannot result in a security violation.
2 • Pouting Concepts
Many possibilities exist for multiple paths from a
source tc a destination at a LAN site since a subnetwork may
have a nuirber cf bridges attached to it and a bridge
connects two subnetworks to each other. In such a situ-
ation, a bridge might be required to decide which path to
transmit a packet based on the dynamics of the load on the
two subnetworks. This decision-making capability sounds
desirable, but the authors have designed their bridges with
static routing fcr simplicity. Therefore, restrictions are
needed tc define only one lcgical path between each pair of
source and destination addresses (for multiple physical
paths) in the LAN. Such a unique path from a source tc a
destination can be ensured by requiring that only one bridge
on a subnetwork can receive a packet destined for any ether
subnetwork at a site.
The routing table in the bridge decides if a data
packet on one subnetwork should be picked by it fcr broad-
cast intc the other subnetwork. The bridge will read the
destination subnetwork number in the header part cf the
packet and pick the packet for transmission to the ether
subnetwork if the bridge provides logical connectivity to
the destination subnetwork. This means that a bridge must
store information abcut all the destination subnetworks that
lie en lcgical paths through it. An easy way of storing
this infermation in a bridge is in the form cf a rcw vector
as depicted in figure 6.4(a) [Ref. 2: p. 51], where 1 in
column n means that this bridge will pick packets destined
for a remote subnetwork numbered n. Note that this struc-
ture would entail programming a different row vector into
each bridge. In order to simplify configuration management.
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it may be more desirable to make the tables in all bridges
identical. To accomplish this, the row vectors could be
combined for all bridges into an Mxn matrix as shewn in
figure 6.4(b) [Ref. 2: p. 51], where M is the total number
(a)
LOCAL NETWORK #
12 3 4 5
1 1 1
1 (0) in column n means that bridge will (not)













1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
Figure 6.4 Fixed Routing Tables.
of bridges and N is the number of subnetworks in the LAN.
To keep this design simple, the routing information in the
matrix is static (dees not change with time). The design
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does allow for future enhancements to include dynairic
updating of the routing- information in the bridges, however
this wculd be at the expense of introducing consideratle
complexity in the trusted bridge software.
3 . Euf fer inq
There is a total finite buffer capacity in each
bridge fcr holding packets received from one subnetwork for
transmission into the other subnetwork. Both the input and
output buffers work in a first-in, first-out (FIFO) fashion,
in that packets arriving first are first to be processed or
transmitted. It was previously stated that if the bridge's
buffers are full, then it will turn off the CSMA/CD inter-
face so that additional packets are ignored until mere
buffer space becomes available. This situation would prob-
ably occur when the receiving subnetwork is overloaded with
excessive collisions, or because the bridge is not
processing the input, lead fast enough.
The authors* strategy of ignoring new packets when
buffers are full is only one option. Another option is for
the bridce to throw cut the eldest packet it has received to
make room fcr new ones. This option might be justified on
the assumption that by the time the bridge 1 s buffers fill
up, the oldest packet in the bridge is likely to be retran-
smitted by the sender anyway. Throwing out the oldest
packet may avoid duplication of packers at the destination
or flooding the LAN with duplicate packers. Note that any
such retransmission would only be implemented in the high
layer protocol (e.g., TCP) that has a timeout option since
the authors have assumed that low layer LAN protocols will
not retransmit. An extension of this may be to automati-
cally purge any packet in a bridge rhat has been resident
longer than a certain fixed maximum time, a maximum that is
keyed to the anticipated higher layer protocol timeouts.
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**• Eal f-B ridqes
Whenever two classified subnetworks cannot be
brought intc clcse physical proximity, a bridge must be
split. In other wcrds each half-duplex bridge wculd be
split. This situation would only occur if there were no
encryption technology able to encrypt the LAN medium itself.
The CSMA/CD interfaces on the transmit and receive sides of
the bridce aust be physically close to the LAN media due to
timing constraints. Therefore, the design issue here is
how to divide the internal functionality of the bridge so
that enough hardware can exist en either side, adjacent to
the CSMA/CD interface, to communicate with the local subnet-
work, while providing a reliable encryptable serial link
between the two halves.
If the half-duplex bridge (figure 6.3) were to be
split, then it is clear that security considerations dictate
that the security processor lie on the left (receiving) side
if the sending subnetwork is at a higher level than the
receiving subnetwork. If the sending subnetwork is at a
lower security level, no security processor is required at
all. Kith two subnetworks of different levels, there should
be a security processor to filter packets going in one of
the two directions. If minimum levels are to be enforced,
security processors would be required in both directions.
From these conclusicns it is clear that there must be a
security processor cr. the receiving side of each half-
bridge, and that the serial encrypted link would lie between
the security processor and the transmit buffers. However, a
great deal of design work is required in this area.
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F. FLOW ANE CONGESTION CONTEOL
Flow and congesticn controls are mechanisms that control
the traffic in the network so that network resources are not
oversubscribed. Flew control regulates the rate of flew of
information between two points in the network. Congestion
control is inherently a multipoint mechanism that controls
the tctal amount of "traffic entering the network to prevent
overload en the aggregate network resources, thereby keeping
the network throughput at an acceptable level.
Flew control in the secure LAN is implemented in the
higher layer protocols. Congestion issues in the secure LAN
differ from that in ether LANs only because bridges are the
links between the subnetworks. Congestion should be a
concern here because of the possibility of overload in a
particular subnetwork by its own subscribers and packets
arriving from the bridges. If a subnetwork is heavily
congested, repeated collisions will occur on attempts by
bridges (and TIUs) to transmit packets to the subnetwork.
Ihis kill probably slew down the rate of packet flow through
the bridce and result in backup of the bridges 1 buffers. In
this situation, the bridge would simply ignore incoming
packets it cannot buffer, therefore implementing a crude
form of congestion control at the link level protocol. This
is probably not a completely satisfactory solution to the
potential of congestion on a subnetwork for flew problems
caused by bridges and it is due to the limitations of the
CSMA/CD protocol. Another option to this might be to imple-
ment a layer of protocol on or within the link level
protocol in the bridges that can be used to quench the
source (s) of data feeding traffic into a congested bridge or
subnetwork. This option might consist of implementing part
of the Internet Protocol (IP) in the bridges, either as part
of the CSMA/CD protocol or as a layer above. Congestion
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ccntrcl cf the IP involves the transmission of a control
packet from the bridge back to the transmitting TIU that
stops the flow of incoming packets. Implementation of a new
protocol in the bridge that is net security- relevant brings
added ccirplexity to the issue. The cost of a bridge that
isolates the security-relevant portions would be signifi-
cantly greater than the simple "pure" CSMA/CD-based bridge
which is all trusted. The ether alternative, which is fully
trusting the bridge containing the IP, may be infeasible due




The sols points cf access to media containing data at
multiple security levels are the TIUs and bridges.
Therefore, they must be "trusted" by LAN subscribers to
correctly perform these functions and only those specified
for them. Such trust is usually the result of a thorough
verification process that examines both normal and fault-
ridden processing. A basic trade-off exists between the
cost and effort cf conducting this process versus the assur-
ance gained from it.
The in fie mentation of the CSMA/CD (within the TIU)
access discipline must be trusted never to modify data, nor
theii associated security label. The implementation of the
security processor mist be trusted never to modify data nor
their security level, to perform its checking function
correctlj, and to maintain the correct security level for
its attached host or terminal.
Three phases of design i apiementation are envisioned
which tear directly en the issue cf trust. The first phase
calls for single-level, untrusted host and terminal subscri-
bers. The second phase calls for untrusted host and
terminal subscribers which may change security levels
(following appropriate sanitization procedures) from time to
time. Each such change requires re-informing the TTU of the
applicable security level. The third phase calls for the
trusted host and terninal subscribers capable of simultane-
ously supporting and governing untrusted processes running
at different security levels. This phase calls for the
rapid multiplexing of multilevel data exchanges. The ether
two phases require that the TIU enforce a single security
level unless there is a manual intervention. The third
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phase alsc implies that the attached subscribers are trusted
to correctly label outgoing data.
A better approach might be to design a Data Base
Management System (DEHS) that would handle data labelling.
However, this protection would have to be extensive since
any variables extracted from classified files would somehow
have to carry that same classification level throughout.
The bridges connecting discrete LANs pose a greater
requirement for trusted functions. Their implementations of
the CSMA/CE discipline and the security processor require
the same trust as these of the TIO*. The management of the
buffer space requires verification that no message intermix-
ture nor ether modification can occur. Finally, the fact
that a bridce spans twe networks, each holding multilevel
data, means that the bridge's security processor must func-
tion as a multilevel cne, with attendant complexity in the
verification. Note that the aforementioned consequences
were not addressed by the authors in their design.
A. AEVANTAGES
1. This design concept enforces a multilevel security
policy ever a collection of local networks and their
subscribers, and it is intended to prevent security compro-
mises ameng cleared but untrusted processes. Therefore, an
untrusted but highly classified process cannot address and
send classified data to a process classified at a lower
level just as it cannot downgrade information that it places
en the LAN medium. An untrusted process classified at a
lower level cannot gain access to data on the media that are
classified at a higher level.
2. The consequences of fault conditions that can occur
during LAN operations are addressed. The error-checking
procedures cf the CSMA/CD function make it unlikely that bit
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errors can simultaneously cause classified data tc be
mismarked in the security field and misrouted in the address
field. Either of these errors will cause data tc be
rejected by the addressee's TIU. Also, collision detection
makes it extremely unlikely that a transmission collision
can result in data intermixing and a resulting compromise.
3. Convenience is the chief advantage of this "trusted
systeir" design. It allows the simultaneous sharing and
protection cf data in an environment of multiple LANs. Even
though it has some advantages cf building on existing tech-
nology, the design ccsts could be quite expensive due to the
data management engineering that would have to be built into
the gates and bridges.
E. EISAEVANTAGES
1. The design concept presented can handle multiple
security levels but has generally ignored the ccntrcl of
need-tc-know. In order to implement this requirement there
must fce additional mechanisms in each TIU to limit values of
the scurce cr destination fields in the packets. Such mech-
anisms wculd protably add considerable complexity tc the TIU
in terms cf trusted scftware. Authorization databases could
te accessible tc TIOs on the LAN with the TIUs making
requests for connecticn via these databases.
2. Each TIU attached to a terminal cannot verify the
identity of the user. Each TIU must believe that anycne
with physical access to the TIU therefore has authorization
to access anything en the network within the range of
security levels at which the TIU is initialized. Many
complex authentication mechanisms (passwords, keys, etc.)
could te implemented, but, as with the need-to-knew, the
constraints of this architecture dictate that the ultimate
granter cf access must be the TIU and not an external mecha-
nism cf the LAN.
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3. Even though the secure LAN is multilevel in the
sense that data cf different security levels are kept sepa-
rated with respect tc subscribers in that subnetwork envi-
ronment, overall security of the data on the subnetwork from
threats cutside the environment depends on the ability to
physically protect the LAN medium, the TIUs and the bridges.
Link encryption might provide protection to portions of the
medium that cannot re physically protected. Except where
the TIUs and bridges connect to the medium, data of all
security levels must he in the red. Therefore, if there is
a physical security breach and a TIU or red portion of the
medium is ccmpromised, all data on the subnetwork is acces-
sible tc the penetratcr. Cnly techniques that encrypt all
data on the medium can counter such an attack. This
possible threat may be compounded by the fact that because
of the nature of the broadcast medium, unauthorized receipt
of data by a comproiised TIU or line tap may not be detec-
table. A problem related to this is a possible malfunction
of the TIU resulting in receipt of data by the subscriber
for which he was net authorized. The use of end-tc-end
encryption would prevent such a compromise.
Unauthorized access to the medium or compromise of a TIU
could also result in an active attack where a penetrator
injects packets into the netwerk to cause a receipt cf clas-
sified data or tc masquerade as a classified TIU.
4. There is no way to remotely disable a subscriber or
control access between subscribers since there is no central
authority capable of granting permission for two TIUs to
communicate. Authority to communicate is distributed among
all the TIUs on the subnetwork.
5. Since the physical subnetwork is assumed to be rela-
tively static, it is net possible to install a new
subscriber of an arbitrary security level anywhere along the
nediun. Fcr example, if in a building containing only a
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Secret subnetwork, cne wanted to add a Top Secret terminal,
it would te necessary to upgrade the entire subnetwork in
the building to Top Secret, or to link that Top Secret
terminal tc a Till on the nearest Top Secret subnetwork in
another tuilding witt an encrypted line.
One advantage of general IAN technology is the ability
to add subscribers wherever desired without disruption of
service. This secure LAN architecture retains that ability
for subnetworks within a given security environment.
6. The problem of congestion depends greatly on the
physical layout of the LAN and its subscribers. The authcrs
did not address the issue of multiple bridges to dynamically
distribute the load en the bridges, or multiple subnetwork
connections for a bridge to alter routing around a congested
subnetwork. Through the exchange of control information
between bridges, either of these enhancements could be
easily inplemented . The congestion problem should be taken
into account because the subnetwork structure is mere likely
to be configured tc accommodate the security requirements
than for lead distribution.
7. There will probably be a delay in packet delivery
time due to the bridges. The amount of delay will depend on
the power of the bridges, the load on the various subnet-
works, and the number of subnetworks a packet must travel
through. The need for a bridge to fully buffer a packet
before retransmission alone introduces a considerable delay
compared tc the single-network LAN delays. The choice of a
datagram CSMA/CD service for tbe LAN protocol makes the low
layer protocols immure to delay, but higher layer protocols,
such as TCP, which provide acknowledgements and may have
timeouts tuned to typical LAN delays, might have problems




8. The authors modified the standard source and desti-
nation address fields of CSMA/CD to contain a subnetwork
address alcng with each TIU address. This hierarchical
structure cf the address is irrelevant to the address-
recognition hardware in the TIU, however the structure dees
restrict the possible destination addresses a TIU may have.
In other words, all TIUs on a single subnetwork must contain
addresses whose subnetwork number has a specific value, or
falls within a specific range, and these ranges must be
unique fcr each subretwerk en the LAN. The hierarchical
address is no particular problem if a portion of the
address-recognition mechanism in the TIUs can be
"programmed" on-site for the particular subnetwork number,
tut the management of subnetwork numbers requires additional
configuration control that is not required in other LANs.
Cnly the subnetwork portion of the address shculd be
configurable on-site in the TIUs, otherwise one would have
to "configuration manage" the address cf every TIU on the
LAN.
The manner in which the addresses are determined could
be another disadvantage. Manufacturers "burn-in" destina-
tion addresses at the factory such that no two devices will
ever have the same address (similar to the embossing of
serial numbers on products) . This technique minimizes the
cost cf hardware in each interface unit necessary tc program
the address on-site, and eliminates the possibility of
duplication among the thousands of interface units tc be
manufactured. However, this technique does prevent users
from selecting specific addresses they may want.
Another method fcr determining addresses would be tc add
an additional software layer which would provide a selection
for addresses for users but could possibly be more costly
than the "burn-in" method.
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An alternative tc the hierarchical address structure is
to use the standard address of CSMA/CD, but to have large
tables in the bridges to identify the subnetwork of =>ach
destination TIU on the LAN. This would require continuous
configuration managenent of these tables if new subscribers
are added fairly frequently to the LAN.
9. Throughout this design concept the authors have
assumed that suitable encryption devices are available that
can handle both the LAN medium itself for those portions of
the subnetwork that are classified but must pass through
unprotected areas, and the lines between the subscribers and
their TIUs for those subscribers remote from their subnet-
work. Encryption for the latter is completely straightfor-
ward, as the TlU-subscrib er lines will involve relatively
low speeds and protocols for which encryption is commonly
applied today. The authors based their secure LAN on a
coaxial cable with broadband signals, implying that the
cable would have to terminate at the crypto units, where the
signals would be demodulated, converted to digital and
encrypted. The encrypted bit stream could be transmitted
using any desired coctrunica tions medium while in the unpro-
tected area, until reaching the other end at which the bit
stream is decrypted and remodulated onto another coaxial
cable
.
Two disadvantages are apparent here. First, there is a
noticeable delay invclved in encryption and decryption of
data and this delay would probably be noticeable tc the
CSMA/CD protocol. This type of delay is relevant to the
CSMA/CE protocol because it is a delay in a TIUs' reading of
its c«n transmission used to detect a collision. The major
impact of a small delay is en performance, but a large delay
could affect security due to assumptions that were made in




The second disadvantage occurs whan there is information
other than LAN data en the medium. An example of this is
when LAN data and television signals are used on the same
troadtand cable. To encrypt just the LAN data without
destroying the TV signals (assuming these are unclassified),
trusted repeaters would have to be used to capture and
rebrcadcast specific unclassified TV channels only.
To deal with the problem of interaction between the
delay ard protocols, a given subnetwork must be entirely
protected and encryption would only occur between the half-
tridges tetween the subnetworks. In other words, limit
encryption to the bridges only, or better yet, incorporate
end-tc- end encryption.
10. Another disadvantage is the case of a low level
user submitting queries to a database in a high level host.
Ihe response from the host would have to be filtered through
a guard fcr downgrading. If the downgrading were reliable
then there is no problem in allowing the query itself to go
directly from the user to the host. The real problem is
that the high layer TCP cannot work: in a one-way fashion. A
TCP acknowledgement from a high to low security level cannot
be permitted in this design concept because security is
enforced in the low layer protocols. Establishing a connec-
tion, even if one-way, requires two-way communications. A
method of dealing with this disadvantage would again be to
design a DBMS that would handle data labelling.
11. Another example related to one-way communications
is the problem dealing with LANs that use control packets on
the network for administrative and maintenance functions.
For example, TIUs might send periodic control packets to
some central destination in order to monitor the status of
all TIUs; or there might be a requirement for a maintenance
procedure that requires interrogating all TIDs to see if
they are responding. Also, accounting information or
statistics gathering may be required.
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The authors have not allowed for any special type of
control packer for which security restrictions do net apply.
These adninistra ti ve interactions will more than likely be
required, and it may te possible to implement these interac-
tions viithin the operational security constraints.
Consideration should te given to building a special-purpose
TIU fcr iiaintenance purposes that can read packets of all
levels while it sends unclassified packets that can fce read
fcy any destination.
12. The last major potential disadvantage lies in the
authors' chcice cf the protocols TCP and IP. TCP and IE are
not commercial standards. To the extent that there is move-
ment toward a commercial standard, the CCITT X.25 interna-
tional standard is favored. X.25 is a network interface
protocol. It is designed to interface between a host and
its lecal packet switch. Once packets reach a local switch,
it is supposed to translate requests fcr service into
another switch-to-switch protocol (e.g., X.75) for transport
to a remote switch which will reconvert it into X.25 again.
X.25 does net provide for end-to-end reliability. In fact,
the standard explicitly specifies several situations where a
switch will close a connection when an error is detected.
Furthermore, there are no mechanisms for demultiplexing or
security. The design is such that a higher level transport
layer prctocol must provide these functions.
The Eurcpean Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA)
and the National Bureau of Standards have submitted a series
cf transport layer protocols with different classes of capa-
bility [Bef. 21] as potential international standards. The
Class 4 prctocol in combination with X.25 provides most of
the capatilities of TCP/IP. It is expected that 2-4 years
cf experience will be needed before these emerging standards
will reach a state cf maturity. Note that TCP/IP went
through four different versions and several large
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perturbations before reaching their present state.
Therefore, X.25 and the ECMA Class 4 together might be
considered viable alternatives to TCP/IP, but X.25 alcne
cannot. Since the ECMA transport protocols have only been
recently made available or subject to extensive testing,
then TCE/IF is prcbably the best product currently
available.
There is one other protocol alternative worth mentioning
and that is Delta T (Ref. 22]. Delta T is an end-tc-end
timer-based transport protocol developed at Lawrence
Livermcre Laboratories. It provides most of the capabili-
ties of TCP/IP class of functions.
It is felt that TCP and IP should be used in the near-
term, however, this position should be reevaluated as the
Federal and International standards mature.
C. FUETEER RECOHHEHE ATIOHS
In addition to the various alternatives and recommenda-
tions that have already been made throughout this thesis,
the following alternative approaches should also be examined
for use in the secure LAN design.
1. Physically separate LANs can be employed using
existing commercially available LAN hardware, and therefore
has nirimal implementation risk. It differs from the
authors 1 secure LAN architecture in that it does not use
trusted interface units to separate traffic in each LAN, but
assumes that such traffic is all of the same level. There
is a problem here, in that, without trusted interface unit
protection, subscribers are left with little choice but to
physically protect all computers and terminals to the level
of the LAN to which they connect. It also would not allow
for easy implementation of the variable-level terminal
concept or support for multilevel hosts.
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2. The option cf using different channels or tile-
division multiplexing to segregate security levels en a
single cable should he examined for near-term use. There is
the obvious adavantage over the multiple cable approach
above, as well as the opportunity to use commercially-
available hardware. However, the number of potential chan-
nels is still rather limited, the architecture is
insensitive to relative traffic load, and trusted software
is still reguired tc allow resource-sharing among levels.
3. Some DcD-sf ensored research is being done in the
area cf end-to-end encryption (encrypting a LAN medium),
permitting a single cable to pass through all WlS-suppcrted
areas of a building regardless of physical protection. The
encrypticn would protect resident data against wiretapping
ty unauthorized TIUs, and access control would be accom-
plished through key distrib uticn. This method would require
encryFticn modules within each TIU, and host IOs which have
open logical connections tc more than one user wculd be
required tc have more complicated encryption devices.
E. CCNCIDSION
This thesis has presented and examined the results of an
initial design-level study tc incorporate multilevel
security into local area networks for upgrading the ADP
support to the WWMCCS Information System. The study focused
en objectives that would be achievable in the 1985 time
frame and therefcre nrake maximum use of off-the-shelf tech-
nology. The design is oriented to minimizing the near-term
risks for an initial fcIS scenario while laying a foundation
for the "maximum" long-term capability for WIS.
The reader should be aware that many of the ideas
covered in this design concept are still the subject of
basic research, and before they can be put into practice,
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